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The Rights of the Accused in a
"Crime Crisis"

YALE KAMI SAR

I

grieve for my country to say that
the administration of the criminal law in all the states in the Union
(there may be one or two exceptions) is a disgrace to our civilization .... The institution of trial by jury has come to be regarded as
such a fetish in our country that state legislatures have exalted the
power of the jury and diminished the power of the court .... The
counsel for the defense, relying on the diminished power of the
court, creates, by dramatic art and by harping on the importance of
unimportant details, a false atmosphere in the courtroom which the

I have relied on the following: Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349 (1974); Thomas Davies, A Hard Look at What We
Know (and Still Need to Learn) about the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule, Am. Bar
Found. Res. ]. 611 (1983); Milton Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Siezure, 49 UMKC L. Rev. 24 (1980); Harvey Silvergate, Simpson Jury Sends
a Subtle Message on Race, The National L. ]., Oct. 16, 1995, p. A21; Gerald Uelmen,
Legends and Landmarks, Criminal Defense, Sept./Oct. 1982; Gerald Uelmen, William
Howard Taft, Jury-Basher, L.A. Daily Journal, Nov. 6, 1995.
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judge is powerless to dispel, and under the hypnotic influence of
which the counsel is able to lead the jurors to vote as jurors for a
verdict which, after all the excitement of the trial has passed away,
they are unable to support as men and women.
Another problem is the difficulty of securing jurors properly
sensible of the duty which they are summoned to perform. In the
extreme tenderness the state legislatures exhibit toward persons
accused as criminals, and especially as murderers, they allow
peremptory challenges to the defendant far in excess of those
allowed to the state. This very great discrepancy between the two
sides of the case allows defense counsel to eliminate from all panels every person of force and character and standing in the community, and to assemble a collection in the jury box of nondescripts
of no character, weak and amenable to every breeze of emotion,
however maudlin or irrelevant to the issue.
Some people may consider the preceding remarks a gross overreaction to the "not guilty" verdict in the 0. J. Simpson case. Others may
think these remarks are right on the money. In any event, they were
made on June 26, 1905, as part of a Yale Law School commencement
address, long before defense lawyers had the assistance of any experts
in selecting a jury and long before anybody accused defense lawyers
of "playing the race card."
The speaker on that day some ninety years ago (I have substituted
"men and women" for "men") was a lawyer who had already acquired
considerable stature-and was to achieve a good deal more. His name
was William Howard Taft. His trashing of juries, and the American
system of criminal justice generally, contributed to a remarkably successful political career culminating with his election to the presidency.
On top of that, some years later he was appointed Chief Justice of the
United States.
Shortly after the Simpson jury rendered a "not guilty" verdict, I
wrote an op-ed piece in a legal newspaper quoting Taft's jury-bashing
comments as a graphic example of how ancient this American sport
really is. I noted that if one had not known who had made these
remarks one would have assumed they were aimed at the jury that
acquitted Mr. Simpson. Professor Gerald Uelmen, a legal scholar with
an historical bent (and one of O.J.'s lawyers), then contributed an article to the same newspaper, pointing out that the parallels to the aftermath of the 0. J. Simpson case were even stronger than I had realized.
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Uelmen made a persuasive case that the genesis of Taft's 1905 jurybashing remarks lay in his experience as a young prosecuting attorney
twenty years earlier in his home town of Cincinnati, Ohio-especially
his dealings with and hostility toward a prominent local criminal
defense attorney, Tom Campbell. (Taft was shocked and dismayed
when one of Campbell's clients, a stable boy prosecuted for strangling
his boss, was convicted of manslaughter rather than murder.)
In 1884 Taft, then a young assistant prosecutor, told the Cincinnati
Bar Association that much of the blame for the recent rise in crime
was attributable to "the wiles of criminal lawyers" who manipulate
continuances and put on perjured testimony. He then warned his
audience: "It is well-nigh impossible to convict a man who has money
in this country under our present system of prosecution." (Now there
is a statement that reads as if it were uttered in the wake of the O.].
acquittal.)
That same year, newspapers editorialized that the lesser verdict in
the stable boy's case sent a message to the "criminal class" that if you
can afford to retain the services of a clever lawyer and get a pliant jury
you can escape the snares of justice. At a mass public meeting, a local
judge called for the jurors who rendered the verdict to be expelled
from the city, along with the lawyer (Tom Campbell) who represented
the defendant.
The crowd then adjourned to the city jail, where an attempt to
lynch the defendant failed. The next night, the crowd returned. Finding the jail guarded by state militia, the crowd vented its wrath on the
county courthouse, burning it to the ground. When the smoke
cleared, 45 were dead, another 125 were injured.
Who was to blame for this outrageous event? A subsequent grand
jury inquiry placed the blame squarely on the jury that had rendered
the unpopular verdict and, more generally, on defects in the criminal
code which exempted so many from jury duty and made it so difficult
to secure intelligent jurors in criminal cases. Blamed, too, were criminal defense lawyers like Tom Campbell, who dupe and corrupt ignorant jurors. Indeed, Taft led a team of lawyers who sought to disbar
Campbell. (The lawyer was exonerated.)
Neither Taft nor any committee of the bar criticized the local judge
who had stirred up the mob. Nor was any mention made of inflammatory newspaper reports of the case.
Taft's attack on juries and criminal defense lawyers in the 1880s
and 1900s met a warm reception-for the same reason the trashing of
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juries and defense lawyers was warmly received in the aftermath of
0. J. Simpson's acquittal. In all three instances people believed they
were living in a period of "crime crisis." When Taft attributed much
of the crime crisis to the "wiles of criminal lawyers" in 1884, forty-two
men were in the county jail awaiting trial on murder charges. When
Taft attacked juries, defense lawyers-and the Bill of Rights generally-in his 1905 commencement address, the murder rate had
soared 500 percent in the past twenty years.
(According to Taft, the problem was that although there had been
a startling increase in the annual number of murders, the number of
executions per year had remained about the same. The clear inference
was that the execution rate should keep pace with the murder rate
and also increase 500 percent. In Taft's time, we were executing some
110 people a year. That number seemed small to Taft, but the total
number of people we have executed from 1976 to 1995 is approximately 300.)
In the 1880s and 1900s, as in the 1990s, it was easy to convince people that the crime problem was so serious that the policy of the Bill of
Rights was too inconvenient to be taken seriously and should best be
passed over in silence. Then, as now, it was tempting to blame the
intractable crime problem on dishonest defense lawyers, ignorant
jurors, sob-sister probation officers and parole boards, or the privilege
against self-incrimination or some other provision of the Bill of Rights.
The 0. J. Simpson case raised serious questions about whether we
take the Constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures seriously today. Without bothering to apply for a search warrant, the police climbed over the fence onto Mr. Simpson's property
(because, they said, they wanted to help and comfort him). It's hard
to imagine that either the experienced prosecutors who handled the
Simpson case or the two experienced judges who rejected Mr. Simpson's efforts to suppress the evidence (Judge Kathleen KennedyPowell, who denied a pre-trial motion, and Judge Lance Ito, who
affirmed Kennedy-Powell's ruling before the trial commenced) really
believed Detective Philip Vannatter's explanation for why he scaled
the wall of the Simpson estate. (As Boston criminal defense lawyer
and National Law Journal columnist Harvey Silverglate pointed out
after the Simpson acquittal, ironically, had the evidence obtained as a
result of the highly questionable entry onto Simpson's property been
suppressed, "it might have robbed the defense of the core of its claim
of a racist frame-up.")
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As might be expected, I had many talks with colleagues about the
"trial of the century.'' I was taken aback when several law professors
I had always labeled "liberal" told me it was a good thing that no
judge had suppressed the evidence found as a result of that legally
shaky search, because if any judge had done so the uproar would have
been so great that the "exclusionary rule" (the rule that evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures must be excluded from consideration) might not have survived. I was even more shocked at the possibility that they may have been right.
I do not think most Americans know, or would care if they did,
that according to the most careful study of the available empirical
data, the general level of the exclusionary rule's effects on criminal
prosecution is marginal at best. Most of its impact is concentrated in
drug and weapon possession cases, the prosecution of which depends
heavily on physical evidence. The impact of the rule is especially small
in robbery, rape, and homicide cases.
Nor do I think the majority of Americans know, or care, that
according to the most intensive study of police perceptions and attitudes about the exclusionary rule, the police would have great difficulty believing that search and seizure standards can have any real
meaning if the government could profit from violating them. Regardless of what "substitute remedies" might be provided, the police are
bound to view the elimination of the exlusionary rule as an indication
that the Fourth Amendment is no longer a serious matter. Moreover,
since the exclusionary rule has become functionally identified with
the Fourth Amendment, police doubts about the importance and relevance of search and seizure standards are likely to be stronger if the
rule is abolished than they would be if the rule had never been
imposed in the first place.
I can hear the critics of the exclusionary rule now. Forget about
statistics, I can hear them say; one lost murder case because of the
exclusionary rule is one lost case too many.
But doesn't the Fourth Amendment embody the judgment that
sometimes at least securing all citizens "in their person, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures" outweighs society's interest in apprehending and convicting criminals? I
realize that the amendment has both the virtue of brevity and the vice
of ambiguity. But doesn't it mean something? ls not its very purpose-and that of the Bill of Rights generally-to identify values that
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may not be sacrificed to expediency? And to stand in the way when
the job of combating crime and convicting the guilty seems such a
pressing concern, as it will in every era, that we may be lured by the
temptation of expediency into forsaking our commitment to protecting individual liberty and privacy?
I can hear the critics again: What you say may be true in ordinary
times. But we are living in times of great danger. We are losing the war
against crime. We can no longer afford a "civil-liberties binge." We
must strengthen the "peace forces" against the "criminal forces."
When, may I ask, were we living in "normal" times? When weren't
we losing the war against crime? When wasn't our society in a "state
of emergency" concerning crime? When could we afford to take procedural safeguards seriously?
In 1910 the president of the California Bar Association proposed,
in order to meet what he called "the expanding social necessity," that
the requirements of a unanimous verdict of guilty in criminal cases be
reduced to three-fourths. This, he added, would still "give the defendant three-fourths of the show."
The following year, in a hard-hitting Atlantic Monthly article entitled "Coddling the Criminal," a New York prosecutor deplored "the
appalling amount of crime in the United States as compared with
other civilized countries." What was his proposed solution? We must
remove two formidable law enforcement obstacles, he insisted-the
protection against double jeopardy and the privilege against selfincrimination.
In 1920, Edwin Sims, the first head of the newly established
Chicago Crime Commission, added his voice to the insistent demands
for "action" that would reduce crime. He had the figures: "During
1919 there were more murders in Chicago than in the entire British
Isles." Who was to blame? Sims focused on "the tender solicitude for
the welfare of criminals publicly expressed by social workers"
because they give thousands of criminals "the mistaken impression
that the community is more interested in them than it is in their victims."
In 1931 the famous criminologist Harry Elmer Barnes predicted that
as grim as the crime picture was it was likely to get worse because the
repeal of prohibition might trigger "an avalanche of crime"-as thousands of crooks chased out of the booze business returned to their old
rackets. The only effective check Barnes could think of was "turning
our cities over for the time being to the U.S. Army and Marines."
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Two years later, the public had become so alarmed at the apparent
increase in crime that a U.S. Senate investigating committee scoured
the country for information which could lead to a national legislative
solution. Several witnesses proposed a "national vagrancy law,"
whereby "well-dressed crooks" would have to prove they were earning an honest living. A veteran criminal court judge maintained that
permitting the state to appeal an acquittal would give the prosecution
a "fair break." A high-ranking police official proposed that an
"expert adviser" retire to the jury room with the jury "to advise them
on those technicalities that had been implanted in their minds by a
very clever defense lawyer."
I have dwelt on the first third of this century because the U.S.
Supreme Court pretty much kept "hands off" state criminal procedure during that period. We know now that the prevailing police
interrogation methods of the 1920s and 1930s included the application of the rubber hose to the back or the pit of the stomach, kicks in
the shins and blows struck with a phone book on the side of the suspect's head. These techniques did not stem the tide of crime. Nor did
the use of illegally seized evidence-no questions asked-which most
state courts allowed in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. Nor, until they
were invalidated by various courts, did the "public enemy" or
"national vagrancy" laws or the many criminal registration ordinances stimulated by the U.S. Senate investigating committee headed
by Royal S. Copeland of New York put a dent in crime.
When I hear about attacks on various provisions of our Bill of
Rights, or on our criminal justice system generally, I am reminded of
a story, apocryphal no doubt, about a certain aging promiscuous
actress. When asked what she would do if she could live her life all
over again she is supposed to have replied: "The same thing-with
different people."
I venture to say that nowadays too many law enforcement officials,
too many politicians, and too many media people are doing "the same
thing-with different people." They are using more recent crime statistics, mentioning the names of different cases, and sometimes focusing on different targets (the federal courts rather than the state courts
or parole boards rather than social workers), but they are reacting the
same way they reacted in past generations.
They are proclaiming great emergencies and announcing lack of
confidence in the capacities of ordinary institutions and traditional
procedures to deal with them. They are explaining our failure to cope
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successfully with the "crime crises" in terms of betrayal. They are
permitting a mood of irritated frustration with complexity to find
expression in "scapegoating."
For as long as any living American can remember, there has never
been a time (at least according to law enforcement officials, politi
cians, and the mass media) when we weren't experiencing a "crime
crisis" -when we weren't being told that so far as the rights of the
accused were concerned, "the pendulum has swung too far to the
left." Any time during the last hundred years-whatever the time
was not the time to take the Bill of Rights seriously. Rather it was, or
seemed to be, a time when (as usual) criminal procedural safeguards
had already been stretched to the breaking point.
I venture to say that no person alive today will live to see the day
when the public is not alarmed and indignant about crime-when we
are not in a "crime crisis." If we want to take the Bill of Rights seri
ously, we better do so now.

